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Abstract
We consider a retailer selling a single product with limited on-hand inventory over a finite
selling season. Customer demand arrives according to a Poisson process, the rate of which is
influenced by a single action taken by the retailer (such as price adjustment, sales commission,
advertisement intensity, etc.). The relationship between the action and the demand rate is not
known in advance. However, the retailer is able to learn the optimal action “on the fly” as she
maximizes her total expected revenue based on the observed demand reactions.
Using the pricing problem as an example, we propose a dynamic “learning-while-doing”
algorithm that only involves function value estimation to achieve a near-optimal performance.
Our algorithm employs a series of shrinking price intervals and iteratively tests prices within
that interval using a set of carefully chosen parameters. We prove that the convergence rate of
our algorithm is among the fastest of all possible algorithms in terms of asymptotic “regret”
(the relative loss comparing to the full information optimal solution). Our result closes the
performance gaps between parametric and non-parametric learning and between a post-price
mechanism and a customer-bidding mechanism. Important managerial insight from this research
is that the values of information on both the parametric form of the demand function as well
as each customer’s exact reservation price are less important than prior literature suggests.
Our results also suggest that firms would be better off to perform dynamic learning and action
concurrently rather than sequentially.
1 Introduction
Revenue management is a central problem for many industries such as airlines, hotels, and
retailers. In revenue management problems, the availability of products is often limited in
quantity and/or time, and customer demand is either unknown or uncertain. However, demands
can be influenced by actions such as price adjustment, advertisement intensity, sales person
compensation, etc. Retailers are interested in methods to select an optimal action plan that
maximizes their revenue in such environments.
Most existing research in revenue management assumes that the functional relationship be-
tween the demand distribution (or the instantaneous demand rate) and retailers’ actions is
known to the decision makers. This relationship is then exploited to derive optimal policies.
However, in reality, decision makers seldom possess such information. This is especially true
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when a new product or service is provided at a new location or the market environment has
changed. In light of this, some recent research has proposed methods that allow decision makers
to probe the demand functions while optimizing their policies based on learning.
There are two types of learning models: parametric and non-parametric. In parametric
learning, prior information has been obtained about which parametric family the demand func-
tion belongs to. In this case, decision makers take actions “on the fly” while updating their
estimations about the underlying parameters. On the other hand, non-parametric learning as-
sumes no properties of the demand function except some basic regularity conditions, and it is the
decision maker’s task to learn the demand curve with such limited information. Intuitively, non-
parametric approaches are more complex than the parametric ones because the non-parametric
function space is much larger. However, the exact performance difference between these two
models is not clear and several questions are to be answered: First, what are the “optimal”
learning strategies for each setting? Second, what are the minimal revenue losses that will be
incurred over all possible strategies? Third, how valuable is the information that the demand
function belongs to a particular parametric family? Moreover, it seems quite advantageous
for the sellers to know each customer’s exact valuation rather than only observing “yes-or-no”
purchase decisions. But exactly how much benefit is it?
In this paper, we provide answers to these questions using an example in which the retailer’s
sole possible action is to control the price. In such a problem, a retailer sells a limited inventory
over a finite sales season. The demand is a Poisson process whose intensity is controlled by
the prevailing price posted by the retailer. The relationship between the price and the demand
rate is not known to the retailer and she can only learn this information through observing
realized demand at the price she sets. Specifically, we are interested in a non-parametric setting
in which the retailer knows little about the demand function except some regularity conditions.
The objective of the retailer is to maximize her revenue over the entire selling season.
As discussed in prior literature, the key of a good pricing algorithm under demand un-
certainty lies in its ability to balance the tension between demand learning (exploration) and
near-optimal pricing (exploitation). The more time one spends in price exploration, the less
time remains to exploit the knowledge to obtain the optimal revenue. On the other hand, if
exploration is not done sufficiently, then one may not be able to find a price good enough to
achieve a satisfactory revenue. This is especially true in the non-parametric setting where it is
harder to infer structural information from the observed demand. In prior literature, researchers
have proposed price learning algorithms with separated learning and doing phases, in which a
grid of prices are tested and then the optimal one is used for pricing. Theoretical results are
established to show that those algorithms achieve asymptotic optimality at a decent rate, see
Besbes and Zeevi [8].
The main contribution of our paper is to propose a dynamic price-learning algorithm that
iteratively performs price experimentation within a shrinking series of intervals that always
contain the optimal price (with high probability). We show that our dynamic price-learning al-
gorithm has a tighter upper bound on the asymptotic regret (the relative loss to the clairvoyant
optimal revenue) than the one-time grid learning strategy. By further providing a worst-case
example, we prove that our algorithm provides the near best asymptotic performance over all
possible pricing policies. Our result provides important managerial insights to revenue manage-
ment practitioners: we should not separate price experimentation from exploitation, instead,
we should combine “learning” and “doing” in a concurrent procedure to achieve the smallest
revenue loss.
We further summarize our contributions in the following:
1. Under some mild regularity conditions on the demand function, we show that our pricing
policy achieves a regret of O∗(n−1/2)1, uniformly across all demand functions. This result
1We use the notation f(n) = O∗(g(n)) to mean that for some constant C1 and C2, f(n) ≤ Clg(n)(logn)C2 .
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improves the best-known bound (of the asymptotic regret) by Besbes and Zeevi [8] for both
the non-parametric learning (the best known bound was O∗
(
n−1/4
)
) and the parametric
learning (the best known bound was O∗
(
n−1/3
)
) in this context. One consequence of our
result is that it closes the efficiency gap between parametric and non-parametric learning,
implying that the value of knowing the parametric form of the demand function in this
problem is marginal when the best algorithm is adopted. In this sense, our algorithm could
save firms’ efforts in searching for the right parametric form of the demand functions.
2. Our result also closes the gap between two price revealing mechanisms in revenue man-
agement: the customer-bidding mechanism and the post-price mechanism. Agrawal et
al [2] obtained a near-optimal dynamic learning algorithm with O∗(n−1/2) regret under
the former mechanism (in a slightly different setting). However, in post-price models, the
previous best algorithm by Besbes and Zeevi [8] achieves a regret of O∗(n−1/4). It was un-
clear how large is the gap between the two pricing mechanisms. Surprisingly, our algorithm
shows that although the post-price mechanism extracts much less information from each
individual customer’s valuation of the product, it can achieve the same order of asymptotic
performance as that of customer-bidding mechanisms. Therefore, our result reassures the
usage of the post-price mechanism, which is much more widespread in practice.
3. On the methodology side, our algorithm provides a new form of dynamic learning mech-
anism. In particular, we do not separate the “learning” and “doing” phases; instead, we
integrate “learning” and “doing” together by considering a shrinking series of price in-
tervals. This concurrent dynamic is the key to achieve a perfect balance between price
exploration and exploitation, and thus achieve the near maximum efficiency. We believe
that this method may be applied to problems with even more complex structures.
2 Literature Review
Pricing strategies have been an important research area in revenue management and there is
abundant literature on this topic. We refer to Bitran and Caldentey [11], Elmaghraby and
Keskinocak [17] and Talluri and van Ryzin [26] for a comprehensive review on this subject.
Prior research has mostly focused on the cases where the functional relationship between the
price and demand (also known as the demand function) is given to the decision maker. For
example, Gallego and van Ryzin [19] presented a foundational work in such a setting where the
structure of the demand function is exploited and the optimal pricing policies are analyzed.
Although knowing the exact demand function is convenient for analysis, decision makers
in practice do not usually have such information. Therefore, much recent literature addresses
the dynamic pricing problems with unknown demand function. The majority of these work
take the parametric approach, e.g., Lobo and Boyd [24], Bertsimas and Parekis [7], Araman
and Caldentey [3], Aviv and Pazgal [5], Carvalho and Puterman [14], Farias and Van Roy [18],
Broder and Rusmevichientong [13], den Boer and Zwart [16, 15] and Harrison et al [20]. In
these pieces of work, the demand function is assumed to take a certain parametric form, and
the design of algorithm is revolved around learning and estimating the underlying parameters.
Although such an approach simplifies the problem to some degree, the restriction to a certain
demand function family may incur model misspecification risk. As shown in Besbes and Zeevi
[8], misspecifying the demand family may lead to revenue that is far from the optimal. In such
cases, a non-parametric approach would be preferred because it does not commit to a single
family of demand functions.
The main difficulty facing the non-parametric approach is its tractability and efficiency. And
most research revolves around this question. Several studies consider a model that the customers
are chosen adversarially, e.g. Ball and Queyranne [6] and Perakis and Roels [25]. However, their
models take a relatively conservative approach and no learning is involved. In another paper
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by Lim and Shanthikumar [23], they consider dynamic pricing strategies that are robust to an
adversarial at every point in the stochastic process. Again, this approach is quite conservative
and the main theme is about robustness rather than demand learning.
The work that is closest to our paper is that of Besbes and Zeevi [8] where the authors
consider demand learning in both parametric and non-parametric cases. They propose learning
algorithms for both cases and show that there is a gap in performance between them. They
also provide lower bounds for the revenue loss in both cases. In this paper, we improve their
bounds for both cases and close the gap between them. In particular, they consider algorithms
that separate learning and doing phases where price experimentation is performed exclusively
during the learning phase (except the parametric case with a single parameter). In our paper,
learning and doing are dynamically integrated: we keep shrinking a price interval that contains
the optimal price and keep learning until we guarantee that the revenue achieved by applying
the current price is near-optimal. Although our model resembles theirs, our algorithm is quite
different and the results are stronger.
More recently, Besbes and Zeevi [10] propose a new dynamic pricing algorithm, in which the
seller pretends that the underlying demand function is linear and chooses price to maximize a
proxy revenue function based on the estimated linear demand function. They show that although
the model might be misspecified, one can still achieve a regret of O∗(n−1/2). Their result is
novel and important. However, they require a slightly stricter condition on the true underlying
demand function than ours. Moreover, their model doesn’t allow inventory constraints and only
considers a discrete time framework. As pointed out in [16] and shown in our paper, the presence
of inventory constraints and the continuous time framework could bring significant differences
to the analysis and performance of pricing algorithms. Similar differences also exist between
our work and that of Kleinberg and Leighton [21].
Other related literature that focus on the exploration-exploitation trade-off in sequential
optimization under uncertainty are from the study of the multi-armed bandit problem: see
Lai and Robbins [22], Agrawal [1], Auer et al [4] and references therein. Although our study
shares similarity in ideas with the multi-armed bandit problem, the problem we consider has
a continuous learning horizon (the time is continuous), continuous learning space (the possible
demand function is continuous) and continuous action space (the price set is continuous). These
features with the presence of inventory constraint distinguish our algorithm and analysis from
theirs.
3 Problem Formulation
3.1 Model and Assumptions
In this paper, we consider the problem of a monopolist selling a single product in a finite selling
season T . The seller has a fixed inventory x at the beginning and no recourse actions on the
inventory can be made during the selling season. During the selling season, customers arrive
according to a Poisson process with an instantaneous demand rate λt at any time t. In our
model, we assume that λt is solely determined by the price offered at time t, that is, we can
write λt = λ(p(t)) where p(t) is the price at time t. At time T , the sales will be terminated
and there is no salvage value for the remaining items (as shown in [19], the zero salvage value
assumption is without loss of generality).
We assume the set of feasible prices is an interval [p, p] with an additional cut-off price p∞
such that λ(p∞) = 0. The demand rate function λ(p) is assumed to be decreasing in p and has
an inverse function p = γ(λ). The revenue rate function r(λ) = λγ(λ) is assumed to be concave
in λ. These assumptions are quite standard and such demand functions are called the “regular”
demand functions in the revenue management literature [19].
In addition, we make the following assumptions on the demand rate function λ(p) and the
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revenue rate function r(λ):
Assumption 1. For some positive constants M , K, mL and mU ,
1. Boundedness: |λ(p)| ≤M for all p ∈ [p, p];
2. Lipschitz continuity: λ(p) and r(λ(p)) are Lipschitz continuous with respect to p with a
factor K. Also, the inverse demand function p = γ(λ) is Lipschitz continuous in λ with a
factor K;
3. Strict concavity and differentiability: r′′(λ) exists and −mL ≤ r′′(λ) ≤ −mU < 0 for all λ
in the range of λ(p) for p ∈ [p, p].
In the following, let Γ = Γ(M,K,mL,mU ) denote the set of demand functions satisfying the
above assumptions with the corresponding coefficients. Assumption 1 is quite mild and has
been adopted in several prior revenue management literature, see, e.g., [13, 21]. It holds for
many commonly-used demand function classes including linear, exponential, and logit demand
functions.
In our model, the seller does not know the true demand function λ, the only knowledge she
has is that it belongs to Γ. Note that Γ doesn’t need to have any parametric representation.
Therefore, our model is robust in terms of the choice of the demand function family.
3.2 Minimax Regret Objective
To evaluate the performance of any pricing algorithm, we adopt the minimax regret objective
formalized in [8]. We call a pricing policy pi = (p(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) admissible if it is a non-
anticipating price process that is defined on [p, p]∪{p∞}, and satisfies the inventory constraint,
that is ∫ T
0
dNpi(s) ≤ x with probability 1,
where Npi(t) = N
(∫ t
0
λ(p(s))ds
)
denotes the cumulative demand up to time t using policy pi.
We denote the set of admissible pricing policies by P. The expected revenue generated by a
policy pi is defined by
Jpi(x, T ;λ) = E
[∫ T
0
p(s)dNpi(s)
]
. (1)
Here, the presence of λ in Jpi(x, T ;λ) means that the expectation is taken with respect to the
demand function λ. Given a demand function λ, we wish to find the optimal admissible policy
pi∗ that maximizes (1). In our model, since we don’t know the exact λ, we seek pi ∈ P that
performs as close to pi∗ as possible.
However, even if the demand function λ is known, computing the expected value of the
optimal policy is hard. It involves solving a Bellman equation resulting from a dynamic program.
Fortunately, as shown in [8, 19], we can obtain an upper bound for the expected value for any
policy via considering a full-information deterministic optimization problem. Define:
JD(x, T ;λ) = sup
∫ T
0
r(λ(p(s)))ds
s.t.
∫ T
0
λ(p(s))ds ≤ x
p(s) ∈ [p, p] ∪ {p∞} ∀s ∈ [0, T ].
(2)
In (2) all the stochastic processes are substituted by their means. In [8], the authors showed
that JD(x, T ;λ) provides an upper bound on the expected revenue generated by any admissible
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pricing policy pi, that is, Jpi(x, T ;λ) ≤ JD(x, T ;λ), for all λ ∈ Γ and pi ∈ P. With this relaxation,
we can define the regret Rpi(x, T ;λ) for any given demand function λ ∈ Γ and policy pi ∈ P by
Rpi(x, T ;λ) = 1− J
pi(x, T ;λ)
JD(x, T ;λ)
. (3)
Clearly, Rpi(x, T ;λ) is always greater than 0. And by definition, the smaller the regret, the
closer pi is to the optimal policy. However, since the decision maker does not know the true
demand function, it is attractive to obtain a pricing policy pi that achieves small regrets across
all the underlying demand function λ ∈ Γ. To capture this, we consider the “worst-case” regret.
That is, the decision maker chooses a pricing policy pi, and the nature picks the worst possible
demand function for that policy:
sup
λ∈Γ
Rpi(x, T ;λ).
Our goal is to minimize the worst-case regret:
inf
pi∈P
sup
λ∈Γ
Rpi(x, T ;λ). (4)
Unfortunately, it is hard to evaluate (4) for any finite size problem. In this work, we adopt the
widely-used asymptotic performance analysis. We consider a regime in which both the size of
the initial inventory, as well as the potential demand, grow proportionally large. In a problem
with size n, the initial inventory and the demand function are given by2:
xn = nx and λn(·) = nλ(·).
Define JDn (x, T ;λ) = J
D(nx, T, nλ) = nJD(x, T, λ) to be the deterministic optimal solution
for the problem with size n and Jpin (x, T ;λ) = J
pi(nx, T, nλ) to be the expected value of a
pricing policy pi when it is applied to a problem with size n. The regret for the size-n problem
Rpin(x, T ;λ) is therefore defined by
Rpin(x, T ;λ) = 1−
Jpin (x, T ;λ)
JDn (x, T ;λ)
, (5)
and our objective is to study the asymptotic behavior of Rpin(x, T ;λ) as n grows large and design
an algorithm with small asymptotic regret.
4 Main Results: Dynamic Pricing Algorithm
In this section, we introduce our dynamic pricing algorithm. Before we state our main results,
it is useful to discuss some basic structural intuitions of this problem.
4.1 Preliminary Ideas
Consider the full-information deterministic problem (2). As shown in [8], the optimal solution
to (2) is given by
p(t) = pD = max{pu, pc} (6)
2It is worth pointing out that one could also define the size n problem by fixing λ(·) while enlarging x and T by
a factor of n. Our proposed algorithm still works in that case, with the length of each learning period to be n times
the length of the learning period in the current algorithm. We choose the current way of presentation to maintain
consistency with the literature.
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where
pu = arg max
p∈[p,p]
{r(λ(p))}, (7)
pc = arg min
p∈[p,p]
|λ(p)− x
T
|. (8)
Here, the superscript u stands for “unconstrained” and superscript c stands for “constrained”.
As shown in (6), the optimal price is either the revenue maximizing price, or the inventory
depleting price, whichever is larger. The following important lemma is proved in [19].
Lemma 1. Let pD be the optimal deterministic price when the underlying demand function is
λ. Let piD to be the pricing policy that uses the deterministic optimal price pD throughout the
selling season until there is no inventory left. Then Rpi
D
n (x, T, λ) = O(n
−1/2).
Lemma 1 says that if one knows pD, then simply applying this price can achieve asymptoti-
cally optimal performance. Therefore, the idea of our algorithm is to find an estimate pD close
enough to the true one efficiently, using empirical observations on hand. In particular, under
Assumption 1, we know that if pD = pu > pc, then
|r(p)− r(pD)| ≤ 1
2
ML(p− pD)2 (9)
for p close to pD while if pD = pc ≥ pu, then
|r(p)− r(pD)| ≤ K|p− pD| (10)
for p close to pD. In the following discussion, without loss of generality, we assume pD ∈ (p, p).
Note that this can always be achieved by choosing a large interval of [p, p].
4.2 Dynamic Pricing Algorithm
We first state our main results as follows:
Theorem 1. Let Assumption 1 hold for Γ = Γ(M,K,mL,mU ). Then there exists an admissible
policy pi generated by Algorithm DPA, such that for all n ≥ 1,
sup
λ∈Γ
Rpin(x, T ;λ) ≤
C(log n)4.5√
n
for some constant C.
Here C only depends on M,K,mL,mU , the initial inventory x and the length of time horizon
T . The exact dependence is quite complex and thus omitted. A corollary of Theorem 1 follows
from the relationship between the non-parametric model and the parametric one:
Corollary 1. Assume Γ is a parameterized demand function family satisfying Assumption 1.
Then there exists an admissible policy pi generated by Algorithm DPA, such that for all n ≥ 1,
sup
λ∈Γ
Rpin(x, T ;λ) ≤
C(log n)4.5√
n
for some constant C that only depends on the coefficients in Γ, x and T .
Now we describe our dynamic pricing algorithm. As alluded in Section 4.1, we aim to
learn pD through price experimentations. Specifically, our algorithm will be able to distinguish
whether “pu” or “pc” is optimal. Meanwhile we keep a shrinking interval containing the optimal
price with high probability until a certain accuracy is achieved.
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Algorithm DPA (Dynamic Pricing Algorithm) :
Step 1. Initialization:
(a) Consider a sequence of τui , κ
u
i , i = 1, 2, ..., N
u and τ ci , κ
c
i , i = 1, 2, ..., N
c (τ and κ represent
the length of each learning period and the number of different prices to be tested in each
learning period, respectively. Their values along with the values of Nu and N c are defined
in (26) - (31), (21) and (25)). Define pu
1
= pc
1
= p and pu1 = p
c
1 = p. Define t
u
i =
∑i
j=1 τ
u
j ,
for i = 0 to Nu and tci =
∑i
j=1 τ
c
j , for i = 0 to N
c;
Step 2. Learn pu or determine pc > pu:
For i = 1 to Nu do
(a) Divide [pu
i
, pui ] into κ
u
i equally spaced intervals and let {pui,j , j = 1, 2, ..., κui } be the left
endpoints of these intervals;
(b) Divide the time interval [tui−1, t
u
i ] into κ
u
i equal parts and define
∆ui =
τui
κui
, tui,j = t
u
i−1 + j∆
u
i , j = 0, 1, ..., κ
u
i ;
(c) For j from 1 to κui , apply p
u
i,j from time t
u
i,j−1 to t
u
i,j . If inventory runs out, then apply
p∞ until time T and STOP;
(d) Compute
dˆ(pui,j) =
total demand over [tui,j−1, t
u
i,j)
∆ui
, j = 1, ..., κui ;
(e) Compute
pˆui = arg max
1≤j≤κui
{pui,j dˆ(pui,j)} and pˆci = arg min
1≤j≤κui
|dˆ(pui,j)− x/T |; (11)
(f) If
pˆci > pˆ
u
i + 2
√
log n · p
u
i − pui
κui
(12)
then break from Step 2, enter Step 3 and set i0 = i;
Otherwise, set pˆi = max{pˆci , pˆui }. Define
pu
i+1
= pˆi − log n
3
· p
u
i − pui
κui
(13)
and
pui+1 = pˆi +
2 log n
3
· p
u
i − pui
κui
. (14)
And define the price range for the next iteration
Iui+1 = [p
u
i+1
, pui+1].
Here we truncate the interval if it doesn’t lie inside the feasible set [p, p];
(g) If i = Nu, then enter Step 4(a);
Step 3. Learn pc when pc > pu:
For i = 1 to N c do
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(a) Divide [pc
i
, pci ] into κ
c
i equally spaced intervals and let {pci,j , j = 1, 2, ..., κci} be the left
endpoints of these intervals;
(b) Define
∆ci =
τ ci
κci
, tci,j = t
c
i−1 + j∆
c
i + t
u
i0 , j = 0, 1, ..., κ
c
i ;
(c) For j from 1 to κci , apply p
c
i,j from time t
c
i,j−1 to t
c
i,j . If inventory runs out, then apply
p∞ until time T and STOP;
(d) Compute
dˆ(pci,j) =
total demand over [tci,j−1, t
c
i,j)
∆ci
, j = 1, ..., κci ;
(e) Compute
qˆi = arg min
1≤j≤κci
|dˆ(pci,j)− x/T |. (15)
Define
pc
i+1
= qˆi − log n
2
· p
c
i − pci
κci
(16)
and
pci+1 = qˆi +
log n
2
· p
c
i − pci
κci
. (17)
And define the price range for the next iteration
Ici+1 = [p
c
i+1
, pci+1].
Here we truncate the interval if it doesn’t lie inside the feasible set of [p, p];
(f) If i = N c, then enter Step 4(b);
Step 4. Apply the learned price:
(a) Define p˜ = pˆNu + 2
√
log n · p
u
Nu−puNu
κu
Nu
. Use p˜ for the rest of the selling season until the
inventory runs out;
(b) Define q˜ = qˆNc . Use q˜ for the rest of the selling season until the inventory runs out.
Now we explain the idea behind our algorithm before we proceed to proofs. In this algorithm,
we divide the time interval into a carefully selected number of pieces. In each piece, we test a
grid of prices on a certain price interval. Based on the empirical observations, we shrink the price
interval to a smaller subinterval that still contains the optimal price (with high probability), and
enter the next time interval with the smaller price range. We repeat the shrinking procedure
until the price interval is small enough so that the desired accuracy is achieved.
Recall that the optimal deterministic price pD is equal to the maximum of pu and pc, where
pu and pc are solved from (7) and (8) respectively. As shown in (9) and (10), the local behavior
of the revenue rate function is quite different around pu and pc: the former one resembles a
quadratic function while the latter one resembles a linear function. This difference requires us
to use different shrinking strategies for the cases when pu > pc and pc > pu. This is why we have
two learning steps (Step 2 and 3) in our algorithm. Specifically, in Step 2, the algorithm works
by shrinking the price interval until either a transition condition (12) is triggered or the learning
phase is terminated. We show that (in Lemma 3 in Section 5), when the transition condition
(12) is triggered, with high probability, the optimal solution to the deterministic problem is pc.
Otherwise, if we terminate learning before the condition is triggered, we know that pu is either
the optimal solution to the deterministic problem or it is close enough so that using pu will
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also yield a near-optimal revenue. When (12) is triggered, we switch to Step 3, in which we
use a new set of shrinking and price testing parameters. Note that in Step 3, we start from the
initial price interval rather than the current interval obtained. This is not necessary but for the
ease of analysis. Both Step 2 and Step 3 (if it is invoked) must terminate in a finite number of
iterations (we prove this in Lemma 2).
In the end of the algorithm, a fixed price is used for the remaining selling season (Step 4) until
the inventory runs out. In fact, instead of applying a fixed price in step 4, one may continue
learning using our shrinking strategy. However, it will not further improve the asymptotic
performance of our algorithm. Also in the algorithm, we always use x/T as the target when
learning pc (in (11) and (15)), but not the updated remaining inventory and time. The reason
is explained by Lemma 1, which states that learning pD (thus using x/T ) is sufficient to get
an optimal performance. This in fact leads to an interesting observation, that is, capturing
the fluctuation of the demand is a relative secondary consideration in pricing in an uncertain
demand environment.
Another thing to note is that the “next” intervals defined in (13) and (14) in our algorithm
are not symmetric about the current best estimate. Similarly in Step 4(a), we use an adjusted
price for the remaining selling season. These adjustments are to make sure that the inventory
consumption can be adequately upper bounded. Meanwhile the adjustments are kept small
enough so that the revenue is maintained. The detailed reasoning of these adjustments will be
illustrated in Section 5.
In the following, we define τui , κ
u
i , N
u, τ ci , κ
c
i and N
c. Without loss of generality, we assume
T = 1 and p− p = 1 in the following discussion. We first provide a set of relationships we want
(τui , κ
u
i ) and (τ
c
i , κ
c
i ) to satisfy. Then we explain the meaning of each relationship and derive a
set of parameters that satisfy these relationships. We use the notation f ∼ g to mean that f
and g are of the same order in n.
The set of relationships that we want (τui , κ
u
i )
Nu
i=1 to satisfy are:(
pui − pui
κui
)2
∼
√
κui
nτui
, ∀i = 2, ..., Nu, (18)
pui+1 − pui+1 ∼ log n ·
pui − pui
κui
, ∀i = 1, ..., Nu − 1, (19)
τui+1 ·
(
pui − pui
κui
)2
·
√
log n ∼ τu1 , ∀i = 1, ..., Nu − 1. (20)
Also we define
Nu = min
l
{
l :
(
pul − pul
κul
)2√
log n < τu1
}
. (21)
Next we state the set of relationships we want (τ ci , κ
c
i )
Nc
i=1 to satisfy:
pci − pci
κci
∼
√
κci
nτ ci
, ∀i = 2, ..., N c, (22)
pci+1 − pci+1 ∼ log n ·
pci − pci
κci
, ∀i = 1, ..., N c − 1, (23)
τ ci+1 ·
pci − pci
κci
·
√
log n ∼ τ c1 , ∀i = 1, ..., N c − 1. (24)
Also we define
N c = min
l
{
l :
pcl − pcl
κcl
√
log n < τ c1
}
. (25)
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To understand the above relationships, it is useful to examine the source of revenue losses in
this algorithm. First, there is an exploration loss in each period - the prices tested are not
optimal, resulting in suboptimal revenue rate or suboptimal inventory consumption rate. The
magnitude of such losses in each period is roughly the deviation of the revenue rate (or the
inventory consumption rate) multiplied by the time length of the period. Second, there is a
deterministic loss due to the limited learning capacity - we only test a grid of prices in each
period, and may never use the exact optimal price. Third, since the demand follows a stochastic
process, the observed demand rate may deviate from the true underlying demand rate, resulting
in a stochastic loss. Note that these three losses also exist in the learning algorithm proposed in
[8]. However, in dynamic learning, the loss in one period does not simply appear once, it may
have impact on all the future periods. The design of our algorithm tries to balance these losses
in each step to achieve the maximum efficiency of learning. With these in mind, we explain the
meaning of each equation above in the following:
• The first relationship (18) ((22), resp.) balances the deterministic loss induced by only
considering the grid points (the grid granularity is
pui −pui
κui
(
pci−pci
κci
, resp.)) and the stochastic
loss induced in the learning period which will be shown to be
√
κui
nτui
(
√
κci
nτci
, resp.). Due
to the relationship in (9) and (10), the loss is quadratic in the price granularity in Step 2,
and linear in Step 3.
• The second relationship (19) ((23), resp.) is used to make sure that with high probability,
the price intervals Iui (I
c
i , resp.) contain the optimal price p
D. This has to be guaranteed,
otherwise a constant loss will be incurred in all periods afterwards.
• The third relationship (20) ((24), resp.) is used to bound the exploration loss for each
learning period. This is done by considering the multiplication of the revenue rate deviation
(also demand rate deviation) and the length of the learning period, which in our case can
be upper bounded by τui+1
√
log n ·
(
pui −pui
κui
)2
(τ ci+1
√
log n · p
c
i−pci
κci
, resp.). We want this loss
to be of the same order for each learning period (and all equal to the loss in the first
learning period, which is τ1) to achieve the maximum efficiency of learning.
• Formula (21) ((25), resp.) determines when the price we obtain is close enough to optimal
such that we can apply this price in the remaining selling season. We show that
√
log n ·(
pul −pul
κul
)2
(
√
log n · p
c
l−pcl
κcl
, resp.) is an upper bound of the revenue rate and demand rate
deviation of price pˆl. When this is less than τ1, we can simply apply pˆl and the loss will
not exceed the loss of the first learning period.
Now we solve the relations (18)-(20) and obtain a set of parameters that satisfy them:
τu1 = n
− 12 · (log n)3.5 and τui = n−
1
2 ·( 35 )i−1 · (log n)5, ∀i = 2, ..., Nu, (26)
κui = n
1
10 ·( 35 )i−1 · log n, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., Nu. (27)
As a by-product, we have
pui − pui = n−
1
4 (1−( 35 )i−1)), ∀i = 1, 2, ..., Nu. (28)
Similarly, we solve the relations (22)-(24) and obtain a set of parameters that satisfy them:
τ c1 = n
− 12 · (log n)2.5 and τ ci = n−
1
2 ·( 23 )i−1 · (log n)3, ∀i = 2, ..., N c, (29)
κci = n
1
6 ·( 23 )i−1 · log n, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N c. (30)
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and
pci − pci = n−
1
2 (1−( 23 )i−1), ∀i = 1, ..., N c. (31)
Note that by (28) and (31), the price intervals defined in our algorithm indeed shrink in each
iteration.
5 Outlines of the Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we provide an outline of the proof of Theorem 1. We leave most of the technical
details in the Appendix, only the major steps are presented.
We first show that our algorithm will stop within a finite number of iterations. We have the
following lemma:
Lemma 2. Nu and N c defined in (21) satisfy: Nu ≤ 3 log n and N c ≤ 3 log n, for n ≥ 3.
Proof. See Appendix 10.2. 
Lemma 2 provides an upper bound of the number of iterations of our algorithm. In our
analysis, we frequently need to take a union bound over the number of iterations, and Lemma
2 will be used. For brevity, the condition that n ≥ 3 will be omitted in the future discussion.
In our algorithm, it is important to make sure that the deterministic optimal price pD is
always contained in our price interval with high probability. This is because once our price
interval does not contain the deterministic optimal price, a constant loss will be incurred for all
periods afterwards, and the algorithm will not be asymptotic optimal. The next lemma ensures
the inclusion of pD in all steps with high probability.
Lemma 3. Assume pD is the optimal price for the deterministic problem and Assumption 1
hold for Γ = Γ(M,K,mL,mU ). Define A0 to be the event satisfying the following conditions:
1. If we never enter Step 3, then pD ∈ Iui for all i = 1, 2, ..., Nu;
2. If Step 2 stops at i0 and the algorithm enters Step 3, then p
c ≥ pu, pD ∈ Iui for all
i = 1, 2, ..., i0 and p
D ∈ Icj for all j = 1, 2, ..., N c.
Then P (A0) = 1−O
(
1
n
)
.
Proof. Here we present a sketch proof to show that condition 1 holds with probability 1−O ( 1n).
The complete proof of this lemma is given in Appendix 10.3.
We first show that if pD ∈ Iui , then with probability 1−O
(
1
n2
)
, pD ∈ Iui+1. Define
uin = 2 log n ·max
{(
pui − pui
κui
)2
,
√
κui
nτui
}
.
Denote the unconstrained and constrained optimal solutions on the current interval to be pui
and pci . We can show (the details are in Appendix 10.3) that with probability 1 − O
(
1
n2
)
,
|pˆui − pui | < C
√
uin and |pˆci − pci | < C
√
uin (in our analysis, for simplicity, we use C to denote
a generic constant which only depends on the coefficient in Γ, x and T ). Therefore, with
probability 1 − O ( 1n2 ), |pˆi − pD| < C√uin. On the other hand, the next price interval is
centered near pˆi with length of order
√
log n greater than
√
uin. Therefore, with probability
1−O ( 1n2 ), pD ∈ Iui+1. Then we take a union bound over all i’s (at most O(log n) of them) and
condition 1 holds with probability 1−O ( 1n). 
A corollary of Lemma 3 is that if pu ≥ pc, then with probability 1 − O ( 1n), our algorithm
will not enter Step 3. When pc > pu, however, it is also possible that our algorithm will not
enter Step 3, but we show in that case, pu must be very close to pc so that the revenue collected
is still near-optimal.
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Now we have proved that with high probability, pD will always be in our price interval. We
next analyze the revenue collected by this algorithm and prove our main theorem.
We condition our analysis on the time the algorithm enters Step 3. Define the following
events:
B1 = {i0 = 1}
B2 = {i0 = 2}
...
BNu = {i0 = Nu}
BNu+1 = {The algorithm never enters Step 3}.
Define Y uij to be a Poisson random variable with parameter nλ(p
u
i,j)∆
u
i ; Y
c
ij to be a Poisson
random variable with parameter nλ(pci,j)∆
c
i ; Yˆ
u to be a Poisson random variable with parameter
nλ(p˜)(1 − tuNu) and Yˆ ci to be a Poisson random variable with parameter nλ(q˜)(1 − tcNc − tui ).
Define events
A1 =
ω ∈ A0 :
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij < nx
 ,
A2 =
ω ∈ A0 :
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij +
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y cij < nx
 ,
where A0 is the event defined in Lemma 2. The expected revenue collected by DPA can be
therefore bounded by
Jpin (x, T, λ) ≥ E
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
pui,jY
u
ijI(∪N
u+1
l=i Bl)I(A1)
+ E
p˜min
Yˆ u, (nx−∑
i,j
Y uij )
+
 I(BNu+1)

+E
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
pci,jY
c
ijI(∪N
u
i=1Bi)I(A2)
+ Nu∑
l=1
E
q˜min
Yˆ cl , (nx− l∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij −
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y cij)
+
 I(Bl)
 . (32)
In (32), the first and third terms are lower bounds of the expected revenue collected in Step 2 and
3 of DPA, respectively. The second and fourth terms are lower bounds of the expected revenue
collected in Step 4(a) and (b) respectively. In the following, we further analyze each term in
(32). We show that, the revenue collected in each term is “close” to the revenue generated by
the optimal deterministic price pD in the same period. We first prove the following lemma for
the first term:
Lemma 4.
E
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
pui,jY
u
ijI(∪N
u+1
l=i Bl)I(A1)
 ≥ Nu∑
i=1
nτui p
Dλ(pD)P (∪Nu+1l=i Bi)− Cnτu1 log n. (33)
Lemma 4 says that the revenue collected in Step 2 is close to the revenue that would have
been collected if one uses the deterministic optimal price pD for the same time period. The
proof of the lemma consists of two main steps. The first step is to show that one can remove
the indicator function I(A1) without losing more than Cnτ
u
1 log n, this is done by bounding the
probability of A1 and some basic probability inequalities. The second step is to show that the
difference between the revenue earned at pui,j and p
D can be adequately bounded. For this, we
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use the local quadratic property of the revenue function at pD. We give a sketch proof as follows.
Proof. First, the left hand side of (33) can be written as
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
(
E
[
pui,jY
u
ijI(∪N
u+1
l=i Bl)
]
− E
[
pui,jY
u
ijI(∪N
u+1
l=i Bl)I(A
c
1)
])
. (34)
For the first term, note thatY uij is independent of ∪i−1l=1Bl, therefore independent of I(∪N
u+1
l=i Bl).
Thus
E
[
pui,jY
u
ijI(∪N
u+1
l=i Bl)
]
= n∆ui p
u
i,jλ(p
u
i,j)P (∪N
u+1
l=i Bl).
Also, as shown in Lemma 3, with probability 1−O ( 1n), pD is within the current price interval,
and by Assumption 1,
pui,jλ(p
u
i,j) ≥ pDλ(pD)− C(p¯ui − pui )2.
Therefore, we have
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
E
[
pui,jY
u
ijI(∪N
u+1
l=i Bl)
]
≥
Nu∑
i=1
nτui p
Dλ(pD)P (∪Nu+1l=i Bl)− Cnτu1 log n
where the last term is because of (28).
For the second term in (34), we apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
E
[
Y uijI(∪N
u+1
l=i Bl)I(A
c
1)
]
≤
√
E
[
(Y uij )
2I(∪Nu+1l=i Bl)
] ·√P (Ac1).
Since Y uij is a Poisson random variable, we have√
E
[
(Y uij )
2I(∪Nu+1l=i Bl)
] ≤√E [(Y uij )2] ≤ Cn∆ui λ(pui,j).
In Appendix 10.4, we show that P (Ac1) = O
(
1
n
)
. Therefore,
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
E
[
pui,jY
u
ijI(∪N
u+1
l=i Bl)I(A
c
1)
]
≤
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
C
√
n∆ni ≤ Cnτu1 log n.
And thus Lemma 4 holds. 
Next we study the second term in (32). We have the following lemma:
Lemma 5.
E
p˜min(Yˆ u, (nx−∑
i,j
Y uij )
+)I(BNu+1)
 ≥ n(1− tuNu)pDλ(pD) · P (BNu+1)− Cnτu1 log n. (35)
Lemma 5 says that the revenue earned at step 4(a) is close to the revenue that would have
been collected if one uses the deterministic optimal price pD for the same time period. To show
this lemma, the key is to show that the situations when the sale terminates early are rare. That
is, with high probability, Yˆ u +
∑
i,j Y
u
ij ≤ nx. This is done by analyzing the tail probability of
Poisson random variables. The detailed analysis is given as follows.
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Proof. We start with the following transformation of the left hand side of (35)
E
p˜min(Yˆ u, (nx−∑
i,j
Y uij )
+)I(BNu+1)

≥ E
p˜min(Yˆ u, (nx−∑
i,j
Y uij )
+)I(A1)I(BNu+1)

= E
p˜(Yˆ u −max(Yˆ u − (nx−∑
i,j
Y uij )
+, 0))I(A1)I(BNu+1)

≥ E
[
p˜Yˆ uI(A1)I(BNu+1)
]
− E
p˜(Yˆ u +∑
i,j
Y uij − nx)+I(BNu+1)
 .
We then show that
E
[
p˜Yˆ uI(A1)I(BNu+1)
]
≥ n(1− tuNu)pDλ(pD)P (BNu+1)− Cnτu1 (36)
which means that the revenue collected in this period is close to the revenue generated using
pD for this period of time. Also we show that
E
p˜(Yˆ u +∑
i,j
Y uij − nx)+I(BNu+1)
 ≤ Cnτu1 log n (37)
which means that the loss due to over-consumption of the inventory is small. The detailed proof
of (36) and (37) can be found in Appendix 10.5. Combining (36) and (37), we prove Lemma 5.
For the third term in (32), we have
Lemma 6.
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
E[pci,jY
c
ijI(∪N
u
l=1Bl)I(A2)] ≥
Nc∑
i=1
nτ ci p
Dλ(pD)P (∪Nul=1Bl)− Cnτ c1 log n. (38)
And for the last term in (32), we have
Lemma 7. For each l = 1, ..., Nu,
E[q˜min(Yˆ cl , (nx−
l∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij −
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y cij)
+)I(Bl)] ≥ npDλ(pD)(1− tul − tcNc)P (Bl)− Cnτu1 log n. (39)
The proof of Lemma 6 and 7 are similar to the proof of Lemma 4 and 5 and are given in
Appendix 10.6 and 10.7.
Finally, we combine Lemma 4, 5, 6 and 7 by adding the right hand side of (33), (35), (38)
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and (39). We have
Jpin (x, T, λ) ≥
Nu∑
i=1
nτui p
Dλ(pD)P (∪Nu+1l=i Bi) + pDλ(pD) · n(1− tuNu)P (BNu+1)
+
Nc∑
i=1
nτ ci p
Dλ(pD)P (∪Nul=1Bl) + npDλ(pD)(1− tul − tcNc)P (Bl)− Cn(τu1 + τuc ) log n
=
Nu∑
l=1
P (Bl)
(
l∑
i=1
nτui p
Dλ(pD) +
Nc∑
i=1
nτ ci p
Dλ(pD) + (1− tul − tcNc)npDλ(pD)
)
+P (BNu+1)
(
Nu∑
i=1
nτui p
Dλ(pD) + n(1− tuNu)pDλ(pD)
)
− Cn(τu1 + τuc ) log n
= npDλ(pD)− Cn(τu1 + τuc ) log n.
Therefore,
Rpin(x, T ;λ) ≤ 1−
npDλ(pD)− Cn(τu1 + τuc ) log n
npDλ(pD)
≤ C(τu1 + τ c1 ) · log n =
C(log n)4.5√
n
,
and we have proved Theorem 1.
6 Lower Bound Example
In Section 4 and 5, we have proposed a dynamic pricing algorithm and proved an upper bound
of O∗(n−1/2) on its regret in Theorem 1. In this section, we show that there exists a class
of demand functions satisfying our assumptions such that no pricing policy can achieve an
asymptotic regret less than O∗(n−1/2). This lower bound example provides a clear evidence
that the upper bound is tight. Therefore, our algorithm achieves nearly the “best performance”
among all possible algorithms and closes the performance gap for this problem. Because our
algorithm can be applied for both parametric and non-parametric settings, it also closes the gap
between parametric and non-parametric learning for this problem.
Theorem 2. (Lower bound example) Let λ(p; z) = 1/2 + z − zp where z is a parameter
taking values in Z = [1/3, 2/3] (we denote this demand function set by Λ). Assume that p = 1/2
and p = 3/2. Also assume that x = 2 and T = 1. Then we have
• This class of demand function satisfies Assumption 1. Furthermore, for any z ∈ [1/3, 2/3],
the optimal price pD always equals to pu and pD ∈ [7/8, 5/4].
• For any admissible pricing policy pi and all n ≥ 1,
sup
z∈Z
Rpin(x, T ; z) ≥
1
12(48)2
√
n
.
We first explain some intuitions behind this example. Note that all the demand functions
in Λ cross at one common point, that is, when p = 1, λ(p; z) = 1/2. Such a price is called an
“uninformative” price in [13]. When there exists an “uninformative” price, experimenting at
that price will not gain information about the demand function. Therefore, in order to “learn”
the demand function (i.e., the parameter z) and determine the optimal price, one must at least
perform some price experiments at prices away from the uninformative price; on the other hand,
when the optimal price is indeed the uninformative price, doing price experimentations away
from the optimal price will incur some revenue losses. This tension is the key reason for such a
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lower bound for the loss and mathematically it is reflected in statistical bounds on hypothesis
testing. In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem 2. The proof resembles the example
discussed in [13] and [9]. However, since our model is different from that in [13] and [9], they
differ in several ways. We will discuss the differences in the end of this section.
We first list some properties of the demand function set we defined in Theorem 2.
Lemma 8. For the demand function defined in Theorem 2, denote the optimal price pD under
parameter z to be pD(z). We have:
1. pD(z) = (1 + 2z)/(4z)
2. pD(z0) = 1 for z0 = 1/2
3. λ(pD(z0); z) = 1/2 for all z
4. −4/3 ≤ r′′(p; z) ≤ −2/3 for all p, z
5. |pD(z)− pD(z0)| ≥ |z−z0|4
6. pD(z) = pu(z) for all z.
For any policy pi, and parameter z, let Ppiz denote the probability measure associated with
the observations (the process observed when using policy pi) when the true demand function is
λ(p; z) with Epiz being the corresponding expectation operator. In order to quantify the tension
mentioned above, we need a notion of “uncertainty” about the unknown demand parameter
z. For this, we use the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence over two probability measures for a
stochastic process.
Given z and z0, the K-L divergence between the two measures P
pi
z0 and P
pi
z over time 0 to T
is given by the following (we refer to [12] for this definition):
K(Ppiz0 ,Ppiz ) = Epiz0
[∫ T=1
0
nλ(p(s); z)
[
λ(p(s); z0)
λ(p(s); z)
log
λ(p(s); z0)
λ(p(s); z)
+ 1− λ(p(s); z0)
λ(p(s); z)
]
ds
]
(40)
= Epiz0
[∫ 1
0
{
n
(
1
2
+ z0 − z0p(s)
)(
− log
1
2 + z − zp(s)
1
2 + z0 − z0p(s)
− 1
)
+ n
(
1
2
+ z − zp(s)
)}
ds
]
.
Note that the K-L divergence is a measure of distinguishability between probability measures:
if two probability measures are close, then they have a small K-L divergence and vice versa. In
terms of pricing policies, a pricing policy pi is more likely to distinguish between the case when
the parameter is z and the case when the parameter is z0 if the quantity K(Ppiz0 , Ppiz ) is large.
Now we show the following lemma, which gives a lower bound of the regret for any policy
in terms of the K-L divergence; this means a pricing policy that is better capable to distinguish
different parameters will also be more costly.
Lemma 9. For any z ∈ Z, and any policy pi ∈ P, we have
K(Ppiz0 ,Ppiz ) ≤ 24n(z0 − z)2Rpin(x, T ; z0), (41)
where z0 = 1/2 and R
pi
n(x, T ; z0) is the regret function defined in (3) with λ being λ(p; z0).
Proof. The proof attempts to bound the final term in (40) and is given in Appendix 10.8. 
Now we have shown that in order to have a policy that is able to distinguish between two
different parameters, one has to give up some portion of the revenue. In the following lemma, we
show that on the other hand, if a policy is not able to distinguish between two close parameters,
then it will also incur a loss:
Lemma 10. Let pi be any pricing policy that sets prices in [p, p] and p∞. Define z0 = 1/2 and
zn1 = z0 +
1
4n1/4
(note zn1 ∈ [1/3, 2/3] for all n ≥ 2). We have for any n ≥ 2
Rpin(x, T ; z0) +R
pi
n(x, T ; z
n
1 ) ≥
1
3(48)2
√
n
e
−K(Ppiz0 ,P
pi
zn1
)
. (42)
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Proof. The proof uses similar ideas as discussed in [9] and [13]. Here we give a sketch of the
proof. We define two non-intersecting intervals around pD(z0) and p
D(zn1 ). We show that when
the true parameter is z0, pricing using p in the second interval will incur a certain loss and the
same order of loss will be incurred if we use p in the first interval when the true parameter is
zn1 . At each time, we treat our policy pi as a hypothesis test engine, which maps the historic
data to two actions:
• Choose a price in the first interval
• Choose a price outside the first interval
Then we can represent the revenue loss by the “accumulated probability” of committing errors in
those hypothesis tests. By the theory of the hypothesis test, one can lower bound the probability
of the errors for any decision rule. Thus we obtain a lower bound of revenue loss for any pricing
policy. The complete proof is referred to Appendix 10.9. 
Now we combine Lemma 9 and 10. By picking z in Lemma 9 to be zn1 and add (41) and
(42) together, we have:
2{Rpin(x, T ; z0) +Rpin(x, T ; zn1 )} ≥
3
32
√
n
K(Ppiz0 ,Ppizn1 ) +
1
3(48)2
√
n
e
−K(Ppiz0 ,P
pi
zn1
)
≥ 1
3(48)2
√
n
(K(Ppiz0 ,Ppizn1 ) + e
−K(Ppiz0 ,P
pi
zn1
)
)
≥ 1
3(48)2
√
n
The last inequality is because for any number w > 0, w+e−w ≥ 1. Therefore, for any admissible
pricing policy pi and any n,
sup
λ∈Λ
Rpin(x, T ;λ) ≥
1
12(48)2
√
n
and Theorem 2 is proved.
Remark. Our proof is similar to the proof of the corresponding worst case examples in [8]
and [13], but different in several ways. First, in [8], they considered only a finite number of
possible prices (though their proof is for a high-dimensional case, for the sake of comparison,
here we compare our theorem with theirs in the one dimensional case). In our case, a continuous
interval of prices is allowed. Therefore, the admissible policy in our case is much larger. And
the K-L divergence function is thus slightly more sophisticated than the one used in their proof.
In fact, the structure of our proof more closely resembles the one in [13] where they consider a
worst-case example for a general parametric choice model. However, in their model, the time is
discrete. Therefore, a discrete version of the K-L divergence is used and the analysis is based
on the sum of the errors of different steps. Our analysis can be viewed as a continuous-time
extension of the proof in [13].
7 Numerical Results
In this section, we perform numerical tests to examine the performance of our dynamic pricing
algorithm and compare it to other existing algorithms. We first provide some suggestions on
the implementation of our algorithm.
7.1 Implementation Suggestions
The way the parameters of our DPA are defined in Section 4 is mainly for the ease of asymptotic
analysis. In practice, we find several modifications to the algorithm that could improve its
performance. In all our numerical tests in this section, we adopt the following modifications.
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• Definitions of τui , κui , τ ci and κci . The main concern in directly applying (26) - (31) in
small-sized problems is that the log n factors would play an overly dominant role. In
our numerical experiments, we find that by properly modifying these values, the perfor-
mance could be significantly improved. In particular, we find the following set of values
of τui , κ
u
i , τ
c
i and κ
c
i give consistently good results in all our numerical tests (for n ranges
from 102 to 107):
τui = n
− 12 ·( 35 )
i−1
, i = 1, 2, ..., N,
κui = bn
1
10 ·( 35 )
i−1 ·
√
log nc, i = 1, 2, ..., Nu,
τ ci = n
− 12 ·( 23 )
i−1
, i = 1, 2, ..., N c,
κci = bn
1
6 ·( 23 )
i−1 · log n
3
c, i = 1, 2, ..., N c.
• The regime switching condition (12): We find that the condition (12) might be too strict
in most of our tests problem (especially after we have reduced the values of κui ’s). Instead,
we find that using the simple condition pˆci > pˆ
u
i works very well.
• The shrinking mechanism: In our numerical tests, we find that the shrinking mechanism
for the price intervals defined in (13)-(14) and (16)-(17) are somewhat slow. In our ex-
periments, we find the following shrinking strategy which shrinks the price interval faster
performs consistently well:
pu
i+1
= pˆi −
√
log n
2
· p¯
u
i − pui
κui
,
p¯ui+1 = pˆi +
√
log n
2
· p¯
u
i − pui
κui
,
pc
i+1
= qˆi − log n
9
· p¯
c
i − pci
κci
,
p¯ci+1 = qˆi +
log n
9
· p¯
c
i − pci
κci
.
• The starting interval in Step 3: In DPA, when we enter Step 3, we restart from the initial
interval [p, p¯]. This is only for the convenience of the proof and is not necessary. In practice,
one should start with the interval [p
i0
, p¯i0 ]. This will also improve the performance of the
algorithm.
7.2 Sample Runs of the Algorithm
In this subsection, we show two sample runs of our algorithm to help the readers further under-
stand its features. The underlying demand functions for these two examples are λ1(p) = 30−3p
and λ2(p) = 80e
−0.5p. In both cases, we assume the initial inventory level x = 20, the selling
horizon T = 1, and the initial price interval [p, p] = [0.1, 10]. We show the results for the case
with n = 105 in Table 1 and 2.
In Table 1 and 2, the second row corresponds to the current step in the algorithm while
the third row represents the amount of time spent in this time period. The fourth and fifth
rows show the current price interval and the number of prices tested in this period. The sixth
and seventh rows correspond to the empirical optimal pc and pu in this time period. Note that
after the algorithm enters Step 3, we no longer compute pˆu. The last row gives the cumulative
revenue at the end of the corresponding period. The deterministic upper bounds of the expected
revenue given by (2) for the two cases are 7.50× 106 and 5.54× 106, respectively.
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Iter # 1 2 3 4 5
Step # Step 2 Step 2 Step 2 Step 2 Step 4
τi 0.0032 0.0316 0.126 0.289 0.551
[p
i
, p¯i] [0.1, 10] [3.83, 5.74] [4.49, 5.07] [4.94, 5.07] Apply 5.01
κi 10 6 5 4 N/A
pˆc 3.07 3.93 4.49 4.94 N/A
pˆu 5.05 4.83 5.07 5.01 N/A
Cum. Rev. 1.43e4 2.48e5 1.19e6 3.35e6 7.49e6
Table 1: Sample run of DPA with λ(p) = 30− 3p
Iter # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Step # Step 2 Step 3 Step 3 Step 3 Step 3 Step 3 Step 4
τi 0.0032 0.0032 0.0215 0.0774 0.182 0.321 0.392
[p
i
, p¯i] [0.1, 10] [1.52, 3.48] [2.43, 2.91] [2.65, 2.81] [2.73,2.79] [2.75, 2.78] Apply 2.77
κi 10 12 8 6 5 4 N/A
pˆc 3.07 2.58 2.74 2.75 2.78 2.77 N/A
pˆu 2.08 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Cum. Rev. 8.89e3 1.81e4 1.38e5 5.72e5 1.59e6 3.39e6 5.49e6
Table 2: Sample run of DPA with λ(p) = 80 exp(−0.5p)
In the first example, λ1(p) = 30 − 3p, one can compute that pD = pu = 5 > pc = 3. Our
algorithm never enters Step 3. In the second example, λ2(p) = 80e
−0.5p, and pD = pc = 2.77 >
pu = 2. The switching condition in (12) is triggered at the first iteration and the algorithm enters
Step 3 from then on. In fact, in nearly all of our experiments, our algorithm can distinguish
these two scenarios immediately. That is, if pc > pu, the switching condition will be triggered
in the first few iterations; otherwise, the switching condition will never be triggered. In both
examples, our algorithm runs 4-5 iterations of price learning and then enters the final step (Step
4) in which the estimated optimal price is applied for the remaining period. Several important
observations can be made from these two examples:
1. The time spent in each iteration is increasing (for the second example, it is increasing
after the algorithm enters Step 3). This observation is consistent with our definition of
τui and τ
c
i . It is also intuitive. At the beginning, we have a very loose price interval with
some prices far from optimal, therefore, we cannot afford to spend too much time in these
iterations. As we narrow down the price range for later iterations, we can spend more time
on price experimentation without incurring too much revenue losses. This also allows us
to test more intensely in the narrowed price interval , and therefore enables us to find the
“optimal price” more accurately.
2. The number of prices tested in each iteration is decreasing (for the second example, it is
decreasing after the algorithm enters Step 3). There are two reasons for this. First, the
length of the price interval is decreasing, therefore, we have a smaller ranges of price to
test in each iteration. Second, as the price range shrinks towards the “optimal price” pD,
we need to perform more intensive testing to distinguish the optimal price. Therefore, we
want to allocate even more time (relative to the length of learning period) for each price
and thus reduce the number of prices tested.
3. In both examples, the learning periods account for about half of the entire time horizon.
In particular, our algorithm can quickly shrink the price interval into less than 5% of the
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Figure 1: Regret as a function of problem size for different algorithms
optimal price within 1/10 of the total time horizon in both examples. All the remain-
ing learning and doing are performed using close-to-optimal prices. This capacity of our
algorithm is one main reason to guarantee good performances.
In summary, our algorithm first distinguishes whether pc or pu is optimal, then constructs a
shrinking series of price intervals around the optimal price. In particular, as time evolves, our
algorithm tests fewer prices with a longer time on each price. And finally, the estimated optimal
price is applied approximately for the latter half of the time horizon.
7.3 Performance Analysis and Comparisons
We now perform extensive numerical performance tests of DPA and compare against exist-
ing algorithms. Remember that the algorithms are measured by the magnitude of the regret
Rpin(x, T ;λ). And by Theorem 1, R
pi
n(x, T ;λ) = O
∗(n−1/2). This implies that log (Rpin(x, T ;λ))
should be approximately a linear function of log n with slope close to −1/2. In Figure 1, we show
a log-log plots of Rpin(x, T ;λ) as a function of n and compute a best linear trend line between
log (Rpin(x, T ;λ)) and log n. In Figure 1, the squares show the performance of our dynamic pric-
ing algorithm. Stars represent the regret of the non-parametric policy in [8]. Circles show the
performance of the parametric policy in [8]. Lines represent the best line fit for the performance
of each policy. Each point in our numerical experiments is computed by averaging regrets of
1000 repeated runs and the standard deviation at each point is less than 0.1% of the mean value.
In Figure 1, we use the underlying demand function λ(p) = 30 − 3p with initial inventory
x = 20, the selling horizon T = 1, and the initial price interval [p, p] = [0.1, 10]. We can see that
the asymptotic performance of our algorithm is indeed close to n−1/2, which numerically proves
the validity of Theorem 1. We also compare our algorithm to the nonparametric and parametric
policies introduced in [8]. One can observe that our algorithm outperforms the nonparametric
policies in [8] for all n greater than 100. It also outperforms the parametric policy in [8] when
n ≥ 105, despite the fact that the parametric policy knows the form of the demand function
while our algorithm has no information regarding the demand. This verifies the efficiency of our
algorithm.
In the following, instead of specifying a certain underlying demand function, we assume that
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True Demand in Family 1 True Demand in Family 2
n DPA NP-BZ P-BZ-L P-BZ-E DPA NP-BZ P-BZ-L P-BZ-E
102 0.3478 0.2739 0.0868 0.3374 0.253 0.3034 0.3737 0.0698
103 0.1601 0.1535 0.0705 0.3596 0.0845 0.1867 0.1158 0.0377
104 0.0383 0.0645 0.0327 0.3080 0.0298 0.0918 0.0668 0.0178
105 0.0127 0.0358 0.0111 0.2338 0.0101 0.0633 0.0725 0.0067
106 0.0041 0.0217 0.0047 0.2073 0.0038 0.0297 0.0574 0.0034
107 0.0013 0.0110 0.0021 0.2166 0.0013 0.0159 0.0548 0.0017
Table 3: Comparisons of the regrets for different policies
Figure 2: Average performances of different policies
the demand function is drawn from a set of demand functions. We show that our algorithm
behaves robustly under demand function uncertainty. In particular, we consider the set of
demand functions consist of the two following families:
• Family 1: λ = a− bp with a ∈ [20, 30], b ∈ [2, 10].
• Family 2: λ = a exp(−bp) with a ∈ [40, 80], b ∈ [1/3, 1].
We compare our dynamic pricing algorithm (DPA) with 1) Nonparametric policy in [8] (NP-BZ);
2) Parametric policy in [8] with assuming a linear demand function (P-BZ-L) and 3) Parametric
policy in [8] with assuming an exponential demand function (P-BZ-E). We still fix the initial
inventory x = 20, the selling horizon T = 1, and the initial price interval [p, p] = [0.1, 10] and test
for different values of n. For each n, we run 1000 experiments, in each of which the underlying
demand function is chosen from family 1 and 2 each with probability 1/2. The parameters a
and b are chosen uniformly at random within the ranges specified above. Note that the set of
demand functions include both the cases when pD = pc > pu and pD = pu > pc. The results
are shown in Table 3 and Figure 2 (the standard errors of the numbers in Table 3 are less than
1% of its value).
In Table 3 and Figure 2, we can see that our dynamic pricing algorithm works robustly for
all underlying demand functions in the family specified above. The log-regret still have a linear
relationship with respect to log n with a slope roughly being −0.5. The nonparametric policy in
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[8] also gives decreasing regret as n grows. However, the regret is much larger than ours. The
performances of the parametric policies are divided. They work well when the model is well
specified, that is, when the underlying demand function is indeed as assumed. However, when
the underlying demand function does not belong to the assumed parametric family, the regrets
typically do not converge to 0 as n grows. This means that the risk of model misspecification
could be large. We also observe that the regrets of the parametric policies are sensitive to the
choice of learning points. In the results presented, we choose learning points p1 = 2 and p2 = 3,
which yields the best performance among all the combinations we tested, yet it performs much
worse than the DPA as n grows large.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we present a dynamic pricing algorithm for a class of single-product revenue man-
agement problems. Our algorithm achieves an asymptotic regret of O∗(n−1/2) even if we have
no prior knowledge on the demand function except some regularity conditions. By complement-
ing with a worst-case bound, we show that the convergence rate of our algorithm is among the
fastest of all possible algorithms in terms of asymptotic regret. Our result closes the performance
gaps between parametric and non-parametric learning and between a post-price mechanism and
a customer-bidding mechanism. Our dynamic pricing algorithm integrates learning and doing
in a concurrent procedure and provides important operational insights to revenue management
practitioners.
There are several future directions to explore. One possible direction is to weaken the as-
sumptions. Right now we assume the revenue function has bounded second derivative. However,
in practice, the demand function might have a kink point (e.g., the demand function is piecewise
linear). In an extension of this work [28], we show that if we know the existence of such kinks,
we can modify our dynamic learning algorithm to accommodate it, with the same asymptotic
performance. Another direction is to extend this result to high-dimensional problems. In high-
dimensional problems, the structure of the demand functions may be even more complicated
and the extension of dynamic learning is not straightforward.
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10 Appendix
10.1 A Lemma on the Deviation of Poisson Random Variables
In our proof, we will frequently use the following lemma on the tail behavior of Poisson random
variables:
Lemma 11. Suppose that µ ∈ [0,M ] and rn ≥ nβ with β > 0. If n = 2η1/2M1/2(log n)1/2r−1/2n ,
then for all n ≥ 1,
P (|N(µrn)− µrn| > rnn) ≤ C
nη
.
We refer to Lemma 2 in the online companion of [8] for the proof of this lemma.
10.2 Proof of Lemma 2
By plugging (27) and (28) into (21), we have Nu = minl{l : n 12 ·( 35 )l < (log n)5}. By doing some
algebra, we can get that
Nu ≤ log(5/3)
log n
10 log log n
+ 1. (43)
When n ≥ 3, the right hand side of (43) is less than log lognlog (5/3) + 1.3. It is easy to verify that
this is less than 3 log n at n = 3 and also has strictly smaller derivative than 3 log n for n ≥ 3.
Therefore, we must have Nu ≤ 3 log n for n ≥ 3.
Similarly, by plugging (30) and (31) into (25), we have N c = minl{l : n 12 ·( 23 )l < (log n)3}.
By doing some algebra, we can get that
N c ≤ log(3/2)
log n
6 log log n
+ 1. (44)
When n ≥ 3, the right hand side of (44) is less than log lognlog (3/2) +2.5. Again it is easy to verify that
this is less than 3 log n at n = 3 and also has strictly smaller derivative than 3 log n for n ≥ 3.
Therefore, we have N c ≤ 3 log n for n ≥ 3.
10.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Part 1: We first prove that condition 1 holds with probability 1−O ( 1n). To this end, we show
that if pD ∈ Iui , then with probability 1−O
(
1
n2
)
, pD ∈ Iui+1. We assume pD ∈ Iui . Now consider
the next iteration. Define
uin = 2 log n ·max
{(
pui − pui
κui
)2
,
√
κui
nτui
}
.
First, we establish a bound on the difference in the revenue rate r(λ(pui ))− r(λ(pˆui )), where pui
is the revenue maximizing price on Iui and pˆ
u
i is the empirical revenue maximizing price defined
in our algorithm. We assume pui,j∗ is the nearest grid point to p
u
i in this iteration. We consider
three cases:
• pui < pu: This is impossible since we know that pD ≥ pu > pui and by the induction
assumption pD ∈ Iui . Therefore we must have pu ∈ Iui , and by definition, pu achieves a
larger revenue rate than pui , which is contradictory to the definition of p
u
i .
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• pui = pu: In this case, by the granularity of the grid at iteration i, we have |pui,j∗ − pu| ≤
pui −pui
κui
and thus by our assumption that r′′(λ) is bounded, we know that |r(λ(pu)) −
r(λ(pui,j∗))| ≤ mLK2 ·
(
pui −pui
κui
)2
, therefore we have:
r(λ(pu))− r(λ(pˆui ))
=r(λ(pu))− r(λ(pui,j∗)) + pui,jλ(pui,j∗)− pui,j∗ λˆ(pui,j∗)− (pˆui λ(pˆui )− pˆui λˆ(pˆui )) + pui,j∗ λˆ(pui,j∗)− pˆui λˆ(pˆui )
≤mLK2
(
pui − pui
κui
)2
+ 2 max
1≤j≤κui
|pui,jλ(pui,j)− pui,j λˆ(pui,j)|.
where λˆ is the observed demand rate and the last inequality is due to the definition of pˆui
and that pˆui is among one of the p
u
i,j .
By Lemma 11 in Appendix 10.1, we have
P
(
|λˆ(pui,j)− λ(pui,j)| > C
√
log n ·
√
κui
nτui
)
≤ 1
n2
,
with some suitable constant C. Therefore, with probability 1−O( 1n2 ), r(λ(pu))−r(λ(pˆui )) ≤
Cuin. However, by our assumption that r
′′(λ) ≤ −mU and that γ(λ) is Lipschitz continu-
ous, with probability 1−O ( 1n2 ), |pu − pˆui | ≤ C√uin.
Now we consider the distance between pˆci and p
c
i (similar ideas can be found in Lemma 4
in the online companion of [8]). Assume pi,j∗ is the nearest grid point to p
c
i , we have:
|λ(pˆci )− x| ≤ |λˆ(pˆci )− x|+ |λˆ(pˆci )− λ(pˆci )|
≤ |λˆ(pui,j∗)− x|+ |λˆ(pˆci )− λ(pˆci )|
≤ |λ(pui,j∗)− x|+ |λˆ(pui,j∗)− λ(pui,j∗)|+ |λˆ(pˆci )− λ(pˆci )|
≤ |λ(pci )− x|+ |λ(pci )− λ(pui,j∗)|+ 2 max
1≤j≤κci
|λˆ(pui,j)− λ(pui,j)|.
And by the definition of pci , λ(p
c
i ) − x and λ(pˆci ) − x must have the same sign, otherwise
there exists a point in between that achieves a smaller value of |λ(p)− x|. Therefore,
|λ(pci )− λ(pˆci )| ≤ |λ(pci )− λ(pui,j∗)|+ 2 max
1≤j≤κci
|λˆ(pui,j)− λ(pui,j)|.
By the Lipschitz continuity of λ, we have
|λ(pci )− λ(pui,j∗)| ≤ K
pui − pui
κui
.
Also by Lemma 11 in Appendix 10.1, we have with probability 1−O ( 1n2 ),
max
1≤j≤κci
|λˆ(pui,j)− λ(pui,j)| ≤ C
√
log n ·
√
κui
nτui
.
Therefore, with probability 1 − O ( 1n2 ), |λ(pci ) − λ(pˆci )| ≤ C√uin and by the Lipschitz
continuity of ν(λ), this implies that with probability 1−O ( 1n2 ),
|pˆci − pci | ≤ C
√
uin. (45)
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Therefore, we have
P (|pˆi − pD| > C
√
uin) ≤ P (|pˆci − pci | > C
√
uin) + P (|pˆui − pu| > C
√
uin) ≤ O
(
1
n2
)
. (46)
Here we used the fact that:
|max{a, c} −max{b, d}| > u ⇒ |a− b| > u or |c− d| > u.
Note that (46) is equivalent as saying that
P
(
pD ∈ [pˆi − C
√
uin, pˆi + C
√
uin]
)
> 1−O
(
1
n2
)
.
Now also note that the interval Ii+1 in our algorithm is chosen to be[
pˆi − log n
3
pui − pui
κui
, pˆi +
2 log n
3
pui − pui
κui
]
,
which is of order
√
log n greater than
√
uin (and according to the way we defined κ
u
i and
τui , the two terms in u
i
n are of the same order). Therefore we know that with probability
1−O( 1n2 ), pD ∈ Iui+1.
• pu < pui : In this case, pD = pc. With the same argument as above with only the pc part,
we know that with probability 1−O ( 1n2 ), pD ∈ Iui+1
Also, as claimed in the previous lemma, the number of steps Nu is less than 3 log n. There-
fore, we can take a union bound over Nu steps, and claim that with probability 1 − O ( 1n),
pD ∈ Iui , for all i = 1, ..., Nu.
Part 2: Using the same argument as in Part 1, we know that with probability 1 − O ( 1n),
pD ∈ Iui for i = 1, ..., i0. Now at i0, condition (12) is triggered. We first claim that whenever
(12) is satisfied, with probability 1−O ( 1n), pD = pc > pu.
By the argument in Part 1, we know that with probability 1−O ( 1n),
|pˆci0 − pci0 | ≤
√
log n ·
pui0 − pui0
κui0
and |pˆui0 − pui0 | ≤
√
log n ·
pui0 − pui0
κui0
.
Therefore, if
pˆci0 > pˆ
u
i0 + 2
√
log n ·
pui0 − pui0
κui0
, (47)
then with probability 1−O ( 1n), pci0 > pui0 . holds. And when (47) holds, pci must not be the left
end-point of Iui0 and p
u
i0
must not be the right end-point of Iui0 , which means p
u ≤ pui0 < pci0 ≤
pc = pD.
Now we consider the procedure in Step 3 of our algorithm and show that with probability
1−O ( 1n), pD = pc ∈ Ici for all i = 1, 2, ..., N c.
We again prove that if pD ∈ Ici , then with probability 1 − O
(
1
n2
)
, pD = pc ∈ Ici+1. We
consider qˆci (which is the optimal empirical solution in Step 3). Define in this case
vin = 2
√
log n ·max
{
pci − pci
κci
,
√
κci
nτ ci
}
.
Using the same discussion as in Part 1, we have with probability 1−O ( 1n2 ),
|qˆi − pci | = |pˆci − pc| ≤ Cvin.
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However, in our algorithm, the next interval is defined as
Ici+1 =
[
qˆi − log n
2
· p
c
i − pci
κci
, qˆi +
log n
2
· p
c
i − pci
κci
]
,
which is of order
√
log n larger than vin. Therefore with probability 1−O
(
1
n2
)
, pD = pc ∈ Ici+1.
Finally, taking a union bound over these N c steps (no more than log n) results in this lemma.

10.4 Proof of Lemma 4
We prove P (Ac1) = O(
1
n ). Note that we have already proved in Lemma 2 that P (A0) = 1−O( 1n ),
therefore it suffices to show that P (
∑
i,j Y
u
ij > nx) = O
(
1
n
)
. For this, define Auij = {ω :
Y uij − EY uij > EY uij}. By Lemma 11, we know that P (Auij) = O
(
1
n3
)
. On the other hand,
∑
i,j
2EY uij ≤ 2M
∑
i,j
n∆ui = 2Mn
Nu∑
i=1
τui ≤ 2MnNuτuNu .
By our definition of τui , we know that N
uτuNu = o(1) (otherwise the algorithm would have
stopped at the previous iteration). Therefore, when n is large enough, 2
∑
i,j EY
u
i,j ≤ nx. Thus
P (Ac1) ≤ P (∪i,jAuij) + P (Ac0) = O
(
1
n
)
.
10.5 Proof of Lemma 5
We start with the following transformation of the left hand side of (35):
E[p˜min(Yˆ u, (nx−
∑
i,j
Y uij )
+)I(BNu+1)]
≥ E[p˜min(Yˆ u, (nx−
∑
i,j
Y uij )
+)I(A1)I(BNu+1)]
= E[p˜(Yˆ u −max(Yˆ u − (nx−
∑
i,j
Y uij )
+, 0))I(A1)I(BNu+1)]
≥ E[p˜Yˆ uI(A1)I(BNu+1)]− E[p˜(Yˆ u +
∑
i,j
Y uij − nx)+I(BNu+1)].
For the first term, we have
E[p˜Yˆ uI(A1)I(BNu+1)] = p˜E[Yˆ
uI(BNu+1)]− p˜E[Yˆ uI(BNu+1)I(Ac1)].
However, p˜E[Yˆ uI(BNu+1)] = n(1− tuNu)p˜λ(p˜)P (BNu+1) since Yˆ u and BNu+1 are independent.
Also by Lemma 3, our assumption on the bound of the second derivative of r(λ), (20) and (21),
we have with probability 1−O ( 1n)
p˜λ(p˜) ≥ pDλ(pD)− C(puNu+1 − puNu+1)2 ≥ pDλ(pD)− Cτu1 .
Therefore,
E[p˜Yˆ uI(BNu+1)] ≥ n(1− tuNu)pDλ(pD)P (BNu+1)− Cnτu1 .
On the other hand, we have
p˜E[Yˆ uI(BNu+1)I(A
c
1)] ≤ p˜E[Yˆ uI(Ac1)] ≤ p˜
√
E(Yˆ u)2
√
P (Ac1) ≤ C
√
n
28
where the second inequality is because of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the last inequality
is because Yˆ u is a Poisson random variable and P (Ac1) = O
(
1
n
)
as shown in Appendix 10.4.
Therefore,
E[p˜Yˆ uI(A1)I(BNu+1)] ≥ n(1− tuNu)pDλ(pD)P (BNu+1)− Cnτu1 .
Next we consider
E[p˜(Yˆ u +
∑
i,j
Y uij − nx)+I(BNu+1)].
First we relax this to
pE[(Yˆ u +
∑
i,j
Y uij − nx)+I(BNu+1)].
We have the following claims
Claim 1.
E(Yˆ u +
∑
i,j
Y uij − EYˆ u −
∑
i,j
EY uij )
+ ≤ Cnτu1 log n,
where C is a constant only depending on the coefficients in Γ, x and T .
Claim 2. If BNu+1 occurs, then
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
EY uij + EYˆ
u − nx ≤ Cnτu1 log n,
where C is a constant only depending on the coefficients in Γ, x and T .
Proof of Claim 1. We first show that with probability 1−O( 1n ),∑
i,j
Y uij + Yˆ
u −
∑
i,j
EY uij − EYˆ u ≤ Cnτu1 log n. (48)
Then by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
E[(Yˆ u +
∑
i,j
Y uij − EYˆ u −
∑
i,j
EY uij )
+I(Yˆ u+
∑
i,j Y
u
ij − EYˆ u −
∑
i,j EY
u
ij > Cnτ
u
1 log n)]
≤ O
(
1√
n
)
(EYˆ u +
∑
i,j EY
u
ij ) ≤ Cnτu1 log n
where the second to last inequality is because Y ’s are Poisson random variables. Therefore,
E(Yˆ u +
∑
i,j
Y uij − EYˆ u −
∑
i,j
EY uij )
+ ≤ Cnτu1 log n.
To show (48), we apply Lemma 11. For each given i, j, we have
P (Y uij − EY uij > 3M
√
n∆ui log n) ≤
C
n3
.
By taking a union bound over all i, j, we get
P (
∑
Y uij −
∑
EY uij > 3M
∑
i κ
u
i
√
n∆ui log n)
≤ ∑Nui=1∑κuij=1 P (Y uij − EY uij > 3M√n∆ui log n) ≤ O( 1n
)
29
where the last step is because κui < n and N
u ≤ 3 log n.
On the other hand, by the definition of τui and κ
u
i , we have
3M
∑
i
κui
√
n∆ui log n = 3M
√
n log n
Nu∑
i=1
√
κui τ
u
i ≤ CNunτu1 ≤ Cnτu1 log n,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of τui and κ
u
i in (26) and (27). We then
consider Yˆ u − E(Yˆ u). Again we use Lemma 11. We have
P (Yˆ u − E(Yˆ u) > 2M
√
n log n) <
C
n2
,
since
√
n log n < nτu1 , the claim holds. 
Proof of Claim 2. By definition, we have
EY uij = nλ(p
u
i,j)∆
u
i ,
where
pui,j = p
u
i
+ (j − 1)p
u
i − pui
κui
= pˆi−1 − log n
3
·
pui−1 − pui−1
κui−1
+ (j − 1)p
u
i − pui
κui
.
When BNu+1 occurs, condition (12) doesn’t hold, i.e., pˆi−1 ≥ pˆci−1−2
√
log n · p
u
i−1−pui−1
κui−1
. And as
we showed in (45), pˆci−1 ≥ pci−1−
√
log n · p
u
i−1−pui−1
κui−1
. Also since pu ≥ pc, we must have pci−1 ≥ pc.
Therefore we have,
pui,j ≥ pc + (j − 1)
pui − pui
κui
− log n
3
·
pui−1 − pui−1
κui−1
− 3
√
log n ·
pui−1 − pui−1
κui−1
≥ pc + (j − 1)p
u
i − pui
κui
− log n
2
·
pui−1 − pui−1
κui−1
when
√
log n ≥ 6. Using the Taylor expansion for λ(p), we have that
λ(pui,j) ≤ λ(pc) + ((j − 1)
pui − pui
κui
− log n
2
·
pui−1 − pui−1
κui−1
)λ′(pc) + sup{λ′′(pc)}(pui − pui )2
≤ λ(pc) + C · (pui − pui )2.
Therefore
∑
i,j
EY uij ≤ nλ(pc)tuNu + Cn
Nu∑
i=1
τui (p
u
i − pui )2 ≤ nλ(pc)tuNu + Cnτu1 log n,
where the last equation follows from (19) and (20).
Also we have
EYˆ u = λ(p˜)n(1− tuNu),
and with probability 1−O ( 1n),
p˜ = pˆNu + 2
√
log n · p
u
Nu − puNu
κN
u
i
≥ max(pˆuNu , pˆcNu) + 2
√
log n · p
u
Nu − puNu
κN
u
i
≥ pD ≥ pc,
30
where the first equation is due to the definition of p˜, the second one is due to (46), and the last
one is by Lemma 3. Therefore,
EYˆ u ≤ λ(pc)n(1− tuNu)
and thus ∑
i,j
EYˆij + EYˆ
u ≤ nx+ Cnτu1 log n. 
With Claims 1 and 2, Lemma 5 follows.
10.6 Proof of Lemma 6
First, the left hand side of (38) can be written as
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
(
E
[
pci,jY
c
ijI(∪N
u
l=1Bl)
]
− E
[
pci,jY
c
ijI(∪N
u
l=1Bl)I(A
c
2)
])
. (49)
For the first term, note that Y cij is independent with ∪N
u
l=1Bl. Therefore,
E
[
pci,jY
c
ijI(∪N
u
l=1Bl)
]
= n∆cip
c
i,jλ(p
c
i,j)P (∪N
u
l=1Bl).
Also, by Lemma 3, with probability 1−O ( 1n),
pci,jλ(p
c
i,j) ≥ pDλ(pD)− C(p¯ci − pci ).
Therefore, we have
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
E
[
pci,jY
c
ijI(∪N
u
l=1Bl)
]
≥
Nc∑
i=1
nτ ci p
Dλ(pD)P (∪Nul=1Bl)− Cnτ c1 log n
where the last term is because of (31).
For the second term in (49), we apply Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
E
[
Y cijI(∪N
u
l=1Bl)I(A
c
2)
]
≤
√
E
[
(Y cij)
2I(∪Nul=1Bl)
] ·√P (Ac2).
Since Y cij is a Poisson random variable, we have√
E
[
(Y cij)
2I(∪Nul=1Bl)
] ≤√E [(Y cij)2] ≤ Cn∆ciλ(pci,j).
The remaining task is to show that P (Ac2) = O
(
1
n
)
. Once this holds, we have
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
E
[
pci,jY
c
ijI(∪N
u
l=1Bl)I(A
c
2)
]
≤
Nc∑
i=1
κuc∑
j=1
C
√
n∆ci ≤ Cnτ c1 log n
and Lemma 6 will hold. To show P (Ac2) = O
(
1
n
)
, it suffices to show that
P
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij +
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y ijc > nx
 = O( 1
n
)
.
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For this, define Auij = {ω : Y uij − EY uij > EY uij} and Acij = {ω : Y cij − EY cij > EY cij}. By Lemma
11, we know that P (Auij) = O
(
1
n3
)
, P (Acij) = O
(
1
n3
)
. On the other hand,
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
EY uij +
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
EY cij ≤ 2Cn
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
∆ui +
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
∆ci
 = Cn(Nu∑
i=1
τui +
Nc∑
i=1
τ ci
)
.
By our definition of τui and τ
c
i , we know that
(∑Nu
i=1 τ
u
i +
∑Nc
i=1 τ
c
i
)
= o(1). Therefore, when
n is large enough,
Nu∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
2EY uij +
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
2EY cij ≤ nx.
Thus P (A2) ≤ P (∪i,jAuij) + P (∪i,jAcij) + P (Ac0) = O(1/n). 
10.7 Proof of Lemma 7
First, by doing a similar transformation as in the proof of Lemma 5, we have
E
q˜min
Yˆ cl , (nx− l∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij −
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y cij)
+
 I(Bl)

≥ E
[
q˜Yˆ cl I(Bl)I(A2)
]
− E
q˜
 l∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij +
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y cij + Yˆ
c
l − nx
+ I(Bl)
 .
For the first term, we have
E[q˜Yˆ cl I(Bl)I(A2)] ≥ E[q˜Yˆ cI(Bl)]− E[q˜Yˆ cI(Bl)I(Ac2)]
However, E[q˜Yˆ cI(Bl)] = n(1 − tcNc − tul )q˜λ(q˜)P (Bl) due to the independence between Yˆ cl and
Bl. Also by Lemma 3, with probability 1−O
(
1
n
)
,
q˜λ(q˜) ≥ pDλ(pD)− C(p¯cNc+1 − pcNc+1) ≥ pDλ(pD)− Cτ c1
where the first inequality is because of the Lipschitz condition and the second one is because of
the definition of N c. Therefore,
E[q˜Yˆ cl I(Bl)] ≥ n(1− tcNc − tul )pDλ(pD)− Cnτ c1 .
On the other hand, we have
E[q˜Yˆ cl I(Bl)I(A
c
2)] ≤ q˜E[Yˆ cl I(Ac2)] ≤ q˜
√
E(Yˆ cl )
2
√
P (Ac2).
Since Yˆ cl is a Poisson random variable, we have
√
E(Yˆ cl )
2 ≤ Cn and as have been proved in
Appendix 10.6, P (Ac2) = O
(
1
n
)
. Therefore,
E[q˜Yˆ cl I(Bl)I(A
c
2)] ≤ Cnτ c1 and E[q˜Yˆ cl I(Bl)I(A2)] ≥ n(1− tcNc − tul )pDλ(pD)− Cnτ c1 .
Next we consider
E
q˜
 l∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij + +
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y cij + Yˆ
c
l − nx
+ I(Bl)
 .
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We first relax it to
p¯E
 l∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij + +
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y cij + Yˆ
c
l − nx
+ I(Bl)

By using the same arguments as Appendix 10.5, we know that
p¯E
 l∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij + +
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y cij + Yˆ
c
l − nx
+ I(Bl)
 ≤ Cnτ c1 log n.
Therefore, we have
E
q˜min
Yˆ cl , (nx− l∑
i=1
κui∑
j=1
Y uij −
Nc∑
i=1
κci∑
j=1
Y cij)
+
 I(Bl)
 ≥ n(1− tcNc − tul )pDλ(pD)− Cnτ c1 .
10.8 Proof of Lemma 9
Consider the final term in (40). Note that we have the following simple inequality:
log (x+ 1) ≥ x− x
2
2(1− |x|) , ∀x < 1.
Therefore, we have
− log x− 1 ≤ −x+ (x− 1)
2
2(2− x) ∀ 0 < x < 2.
Apply this relationship to the final term in (40) and note that for any z ∈ [1/3, 2/3] and
p(s) ∈ [1/2, 3/2],
2
3
≤
1
2 + z − zp(s)
1
2 + z0 − z0p(s)
≤ 2, (50)
we have
K(Ppiz0 ,Ppiz ) ≤ nEpiz0
∫ 1
0
1
2(2− 1/2+z0−z0p(s)1/2+z−zp(s) )
(z0 − z)2(1− p(s))2
(1/2 + z0 − z0p(s))2 ds ≤ nE
pi
z0
∫ 1
0
(z0 − z)2(1− p(s))2
(1/2 + z0 − z0p(s))2 ds.
Also, for z ∈ [1/3, 2/3] and p(s) ∈ [1/2, 3/2], we have
1
2
+ z0 − z0p(s) ≥ 1
4
.
Therefore, we have
K(Ppiz0 ,Ppiz ) ≤ 16n(z0 − z)2Epiz0
∫ 1
0
(1− p(s))2ds.
However, under the case when the parameter is z0, we have p
D = 1 and
Rpin(x, T ; z0) = 1−
Jpin (x, T ; z0)
JDn (x, T ; z0)
≥ E
pi
z0
∫ 1
0
(r(pD)− r(p(s)))ds
Epiz0
∫ 1
0
r(pD)ds
≥ 2
3
Epiz0
∫ 1
0
(1− p(s))2ds
where the first inequality follows from the definition of JD and that we relaxed the inventory
constraint, and the second inequality is because of the 4th condition in Lemma 8. Therefore,
K(Ppiz0 ,Ppiz ) ≤ 24n(z0 − z)2Rpin(x, T ; z0),
and Lemma 9 holds. 
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10.9 Proof of Lemma 10
We define two intervals Cz0 and Czn1 as follows:
Cz0 = [p
D(z0)− 1
48n1/4
, pD(z0) +
1
48n1/4
] and Czn1 = [p
D(zn1 )−
1
48n1/4
, pD(zn1 ) +
1
48n1/4
].
Note that by the 5th property in Lemma 8, we know that Cz0 and Czn1 are disjoint.
By the 4th property in Lemma 8, we have for any z,
r(pD(z); z)− r(p; z) ≥ 2
3
(p− pD(z))2. (51)
Also by the definition of the regret function, we have
Rpin(x, T ; z0) ≥
Epiz0
∫ 1
0
{r(pD(z0); z0)− r(p(s); z0)}ds
Epiz0
∫ 1
0
r(pD(z0); z0)ds
≥ 4
3(48)2
√
n
Epiz0
∫ 1
0
I(p(s) ∈ Czn1 )ds
=
4
3(48)2
√
n
∫ 1
0
Ppi(s)z0 (p(s) ∈ Czn1 )ds, (52)
where the first inequality is because we relaxed the inventory constraint when using pi, and the
second inequality is because of (51), the definition of Czn1 and that the denominator is 1/2.
In the last equality, Ppi(s)z0 is the probability measure under policy pi and up to time s (with
underlying demand function has parameter z0). Similarly, we have
Rpin(x, T ; z
n
1 ) ≥
Epiz1
∫ 1
0
{r(pD(zn1 ); zn1 )− r(p(s); zn1 )}ds
Epizn1
∫ 1
0
r(pD(zn1 ); z
n
1 )ds
≥ 2
3(48)2
√
n
Epizn1
∫ 1
0
I(p(s) /∈ Czn1 )ds
=
2
3(48)2
√
n
∫ 1
0
Ppi(s)zn1 (p(s) /∈ Czn1 )ds, (53)
where in the second inequality, we use the fact that the denominator is less than 1, and in the
last equality, Ppi(s)z1 is defined similarly as the one in (52).
Now consider any decision rule that maps historical demands up to time s into one of the
following two sets:
H1 : p(s) ∈ Czn1
H2 : p(s) /∈ Czn1 .
By Theorem 2.2 in [27], we have the following bound on the probability of error of any decision
rule:
Ppi(s)z0 {p(s) ∈ Czn1 }+ P
pi(s)
zn1
{p(s) /∈ Czn1 } ≥
1
2
e
−K(Ppi(s)z0 ,P
pi(s)
zn1
)
.
However, by the definition of the K-L divergence (40), we know that
K(Ppiz0 ,Ppizn1 )−K(P
pi(s)
z0 ,Ppi(s)zn1 ) ≥ E
pi
z0
∫ 1
s
1
2(2− 1/2+z0−z0p(s)1/2+z−zp(s) )
(z0 − z)2(1− p(s))2
(1/2 + z0 − z0p(s))2 ds ≥ 0,
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where the last inequality is because of (50). Therefore, we have
Ppi(s)z0 {p(s) ∈ Czn1 }+ P
pi(s)
zn1
{p(s) /∈ Czn1 } ≥
1
2
e
−K(Ppiz0 ,P
pi
zn1
)
.
Now we add (52) and (53) together. We have
Rpin(x, T ; z0) +R
pi
n(x, T ; z
n
1 ) ≥
2
3(48)2
√
n
∫ 1
0
{Ppi(s)z0 (p(s) ∈ Czn1 ) + P
pi(s)
zn1
(p(s) /∈ Czn1 )}ds
≥ 1
3(48)2
√
n
e
−K(Ppiz0 ,P
pi
zn1
)
.
Thus, Lemma 10 holds. 
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